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ABSTRACT 
The West African country ofNiger is among the poorest in the world with a population that 
is inadequately served by the formal financial system and a declining economy with an artificial 
financial deepening. The establishment of the credit unions movement could become the most 
important fmancial intermediary, especially in the rural areas of the country. 
The investigation of the performance of the CU movement has found the young movement 
to be healthy and rapidly growing as shown by PEARLS ratios, descriptive statistics, and 
econometric model results. Several elements remain at the core of the still growing movement and 
will affect its future growth. That include increase women participation, use of market rates of 
interest on loans, and using strictly members mobilized savings as loan sources instead of relying 
on external funds, generating larger loan portfolios by mobilizing more savings and increasing 
outstanding loans to savings ratios. These elements would prove crucial in determining the long term 
viability and sustainability of the CUs in Niger. 
PROFILE OF THE NIGER CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT 
by 
Korotoumou Ouattara, Mayada M. Baydas, and Douglas H. Graham 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Niger, a Sub-Saharan country in the Sahel region of West Africa, has a total surface area of 
1,265,000 square kilometers of which 75 percent is desert, 13 percent is semi-arid, and only 12 
percent is suitable for agriculture. It is a land-locked country, which shares borders with Nigeria, and 
Benin in the South, Burkina Faso and Mali in the West, Algeria and Libya in the North, and Chad 
in the East. The country depends to a large degree on both import and export trade with Nigeria for 
its economic development. Niger's population was estimated at 8.36 million people in 1993, most 
of whom are located within 200 km of the southern border, where there is adequate rainfall for 
agricultural activity (IMF statistics). The population is estimated to reach 21.3 million by the year 
2025 with an annual population growth rate of3.3 percent. Most ofNiger's population (80 percent) 
lives in rural areas and practices agriculture or livestock rearing. However, urban areas are rapidly 
growing with a 6.6 percent annual growth rate that is higher than the 4.2 percent growth recorded 
for the rural population. The country is subdivided into eight regions or departments which are 
Agadez, Diffa, Dosso, Maradi, Tahoua, Tillabery, Zinder, and Niamey-commune. The major urban 
areas are Niamey, Maradi, Zinder, Tahoua, and Arlit. The majority of the population belongs to the 
Rausa ethnic group (53.6 percent), Zarma-Songhai are 21 percent, Fulanis are 10.4 percent, and 
Tuareg account for 9.2 percent of the population (Niger census, 1988). Almost all Nigeriens are 
Muslim and literacy rates rank quite low at 31 percent, with 44 percent of adult men being literate 
and 18 percent of literate adult women. 
This introductory section is followed in section II by a review of the Niger economy 
including the financial markets. The performance of the Niger CU movement is assessed in section 
III. Concluding comments are provided in section IV. 
II. THE NIGER ECONOMY 
A. General Characteristics and Indicators 
Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world with a Gross National Product (GNP) per 
capita of US $ 280 in 1992 despite its uranium resources. Niger is in fact poorer than most of its 
neighbors with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita twice as low as that of the average West 
African country. The Sahelien climate in Niger makes the country vulnerable to drastic weather 
conditions and especially drought. Thus, a prolonged drought in the 70s resulted in a declining GDP 
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between 1970 and 1980. GDP in 1991 was FCF A 665.9 billion (US $2.6 billion) and over the period 
1970-82, GDP grew at an average annual rate of 4 percent. However, GDP per capita declined at 
an average of 0.8 percent over the same period due a higher population increase. 
In the period 1980-91, GNP per capita grew at a negative rate of -0.9 percent with an 
inflation rate of 2.3 percent for the period. Despite structural adjustment measures by the World 
Bank and the IMF, Niger's economic situation has deteriorated and GNP per capita growth stayed 
negative at -1.8 percent during the period 1985-92 (World Bank African Development Indicators, 
1995). The situation is not likely to improve soon due to a depressed international uranium market, 
the major foreign exchange earner for the country until the late 1980s. The next structural 
adjustments reform efforts will be concentrating on reducing the cost of producing uranium in Niger 
to improve the county's competitiveness and government finances. 
Although the principal foreign-exchange earner in Niger is uranium, agriculture remains 
important for the country's economy as the majority of the population, up to 90 percent, derives their 
livelihood from agricultural related activities. Agriculture represented 38 percent ofGDP in 1991, 
the industrial sector accounted for 19 percent, and services for 42 percent (Table 1 ). The agricultural 
sector and in particular farming in Niger is done by small holders and the principal food crops are 
millet, sorghum, cowpeas (niebe), and cassava of which very little is sold (less than 20 percent). The 
main cash crops are groundnuts, and cotton. Most farming is rainfed and depends on the rainy 
season from May to September. Livestock is the second most important foreign exchange earner 
in Niger but is highly vulnerable to drought. Thus, huge losses were incurred in livestock (mainly 
cattle) during the drought in 1984 but numbers have risen again with the intermittent return of the 
rains in 1985 and thereafter. Due to Niger's ecological and demographic constraints, the government 
has not been able to launch intensive commercial livestock operations. 
Table 1: Sectoral Components of GDP in Niger's Economy 
1986 1991 
Value in billion Percent share in Value in billion Percent share 
FCFA GDP FCFA inGDP 
1. Agriculture 237.9 37.0 247.4 38.4 
2. Industry 141.8 22.0 125.2 19.4 
Manufacturing 49.3 7.7 53.9 8.4 
3. Services 263.7 41.0 271.7 42.2 
Total GOP 643.4 100.0 644.3 100.0 
Source: World Bank, World tables, 1995. 
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The industrial sector is dominated by mining and uranium in particular which provides Niger 
with most of its foreign exchange. Uranium accounted for close to 75 percent of export earnings in 
1989 (EIU, 1994). Uranium exports have fallen in recent years due to a depressed world market and 
uranium currently finances 8 percent of the national budget compared to 40 percent in 1979. The 
manufacturing sub-sector in Niger is still small and concentrated around the processing of 
agricultural products, such as, oilseeds, rice, cotton, and livestock products. 
The services sector and especially tourism has been disrupted by the Tuareg rebellion in the 
Northern area of Agadez. However, the latest peace accord between the government and the rebels, 
reached in early 1995, should improve the situation in the near future and revive a one-time dynamic 
tourism sector. That should also have positive repercussions on the whole economy. 
B. THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN NIGER 
1. Formal and Informal Finance in Niger 
Niger is a member of the West African Monetary Union, the Union Monetaire Ouest 
Africaine (UMOA) and uses the CFA franc (FCFA) for currency.1 The CFA franc is pegged to the 
French Franc (FF), with a fixed parity rate of 100 FCF A per 1 FF after the devaluation of the 
currency which occurred in January 1994.2 The formal financial sector in Niger is made up of a 
Central Bank, i.e., the Banque Centrale des Etats de 1' Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEA0)3, a few 
commercial banks, and insurance companies. The history of the banking sector in Niger is riddled 
with failures of financial institutions one after the other and the picture of the formal financial sector 
today is not very different :from that of the late 1980s, when Niger lacked an institutional system of 
financial intermediation (Graham et al., 1987). The existing commercial banks in Niger still have 
a high urban bias. They are all located in Niamey, the capital and have just a few or no branches in 
rural areas of the country. The policies of the BCEAO put a ceiling on the amount of credit by bank, 
a ceiling on interest rates for loans\ and offered a rediscount facility to banks to finance credit with 
central bank monetary creation instead of through deposit mobilization. All these policies 
encouraged banks to limit their services to a narrow customer base. Thus, the Nigerien formal 
financial system is characterized by a nominal growth of monetary aggregates that has not lead to 
a comparable increase in loans. In fact, overall credit to the economy has been declining despite a 
1 UMOA includes seven Francophone West African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, and Togo. 
2 The CFA Franc was pegged to French Franc for 26 years (since 1948) at FF 1 = FCFA 50 before the 
devaluation. 
3 BCEAO is a regional bank with headquarters in Dakar, senegal and agencies in each UMOA member state. 
4 BCEAO interest rate policy on loans sets an usury rate to be applied by banks which is twice the rediscolUlt rate. 
However, BCEAO has began a restructuring of its procedures including its interest rate policies. 
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growth in deposits (Table 2). The excess reserves of banks were used instead to purchase other 
assets or were placed with the BCEAO. The ratio of money plus quasi money over GDP has 
increased from 13.40 to 19.97 percent which would indicate modest financial deepening of the 
economy between 1974 and 1993 (World Bank, 1994). However, these indicators, the lowest among 
all other Francophone African countries, reflect an artificial deepening caused by the combination 
of excess liquidity in the financial market and decreasing GDP. 
Table 2: Five-Year Averages of Financial Indicators for the Niger Economy from 1974-1993 (in 
Percentages). 
Periods Demand Time deposits/ Claims on Real Real Gross Inflation 
Depositsff otal Total liabilities private sector/ lending deposit margin rate 
Liabilities Total assets rate rate 
1974-78 34.88 11.16 79.01 -4.92 -6.69 1.33 14.21 
1979-83 28.14 11.00 79.33 0.07 -2.72 2.79 10.23 
1984-88 24.99 21.32 67.77 15.11 8.78 6.33 -2.49 
1989-93 20.74 28.23 55.54 19.44 10.19 9.25 -2.19 
Source: The World Bank. 
The only financial system which served the rural sector via branches throughout the country 
was a high cost agricultural input delivery system run by the Niger Union of Credit Cooperatives 
(UNCC) and the Agricultural Credit Bank (CNCA). Neither of these entities engaged in real 
financial intermediation between borrowers and savers. The CNCA activities resulted in a truncated 
credit delivery system which provided loans to farmers to purchase agricultural inputs and 
implements through the use of central bank and external donor lines of credit. The CNCA never 
attempted to mobilize savings on a large scale, limiting its deposit accounts to those oflarge donors, 
irrigated perimeter cooperatives, government parastatals, and a limited number of other cooperatives 
supported by Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and/or other donors. The other financial 
institution which offered much needed deposit services to the rural population was the postal system 
in Niger represented by the Caisse Nationale d'Epargne (CNE) with 46 branches throughout the 
country. The now moribund CNE coupled with the liquidation of the CNCA in 1986 created a 
vacuum that NGOs and other donors felt compelled to fill. 
These still emerging entities form today the bulk of the semi-formal financial sector in Niger. 
However, NGOs and donors operate with different and sometimes conflicting approaches to 
financial intermediation. These practices include programs or projects dealing with both savings and 
credit, targeted credit programs with credit delivery as the major and only activity, and programs that 
make loans and engage in credit as a secondary activity, i.e. part time credit programs. The credit 
union (CU) movement is the only savings and loan program that stress a savings mobilization-first 
approach and do not rely on donor funds for on-lending activities. On the other hand, the informal 
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financial system in Niger is still vibrant and is comprised of the array of neighbors, friends and 
family, as well as traditional money keepers and money lenders and rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs) called tontines. Savings in the informal sector are undertaken primarily 
through tontines which are usually women's groups while informal loan activities are carried out 
primarily by friends, family members, and traditional money keepers. Informal loans are usually 
short term, and carry no interest when granted by family members. However, the traditional money 
lender, usually a trader, may charge very high interest rates on small, short term loans. Most loans 
by informal agents have flexible repayment schedules and can be rescheduled easily. That flexibility 
in loan contracts and other still unmatched services explain why the informal sector remains dynamic 
especially in rural Niger. 
The central bank (BCEAO) has been blamed for discouraging the emergence of other 
financial intermediaries capable of competing with banks through inflexible interest rate policies and 
high barriers to entry for new banks and non-bank financial institutions. However, the BCEAO's 
recent restructuring of its rules and regulations should provide UMOA countries and Niger in 
particular with the tools to fill the missing middle created by the formerly stringent banking 
regulations. It is doubtful that targeted credit programs and guarantee fund programs with no 
savings mobilization objective are viable and sustainable in the long-run. The CU program that 
offers both savings and loan services and relies strictly on mobilized funds offers the most promise 
to Niger's population. With the proper prudential and regulatory framework, and a carefully 
monitored growth, CUs in Niger could become the most sustainable fmancial intermediaries, 
especially in the rural areas of the country where banks are virtually non existent. 
2. Financial Deepening in Niger 
An important indicator of the growing complexity of an economy is the degree of financial 
sophistication and the spread of financial market instruments. This is commonly measured by 
examining the growth of money aggregates and the ratio of money to GDP, the velocity of money 
and the relationship between currency and deposits. 
The relevant data for a five year period 1974-1993 are reported in Table 2 and Table 3. The 
data show that the claims on private sector have declined overtime from 79.01 percent in 1974-78 
to 55.54 percent in 1989-93. One reason could be the write-off of several loans after numerous bank 
failures in the 1980's and early 90s. The rise in real lending rate from -4.92 to 19.44 could also be 
another reason why bank claims on private sector declined. The decline in demand deposits from 
34.88 percent to 20.74 percent on the one hand and rise in time deposits from 11.16 to 28.23 percent 
on the other hand could be attributed to real interest rates on deposits going up from a negative 6.69 
percent to 10.19 percent. Bank margins saw an increase from 1.33 to 9.25 from an overly liquid 
formal fmancial sector which made fewer loans to the private sector despite a continued increase in 
time deposits (Table 2). 
The ratio of money plus quasi money over GDP has increased from 13.40 to 19.97 percent 
which would indicate some financial deepening of the economy but that was an artificial deepening 
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caused by the combination of excess liquidity in the financial market and decreasing GDP. In fact, 
the fmancial deepening indicator for Niger is the lowest among several other Francophone African 
countries (Table 3). 
Table 3: 
Country 
Gabon 
1974-78 
1979-83 
1984-88 
1989-93 
Cameroon 
1974-78 
1979-83 
1984-88 
1989-93 
Cl'lte d'Ivoire 
1974-78 
1979-83 
1984-88 
1989-93 
Senegal 
1974-78 
1979-83 
1984-88 
1989-93 
Zaire 
1974-78 
1979-83 
1984-88 
1989-93 
Niger 
1974-78 
1979-83 
1984-88 
1989-93 
Burkina Faso 
1974-78 
1979-83 
1984-88 
1989-93 
Financial Deepening Measures for Niger and Selected Francophone African Countries: 
1974-1993. 
% Quasi Money of GDP 
3.46 
6.32 
8.80 
7.33 
6.47 
8.62 
10.44 
8.96 
8.50 
7.30 
10.19 
11.22 
25.61 
29.48 
25.29 
25.01 
4.71 
2.62 
1.54 
1.91 
246 
5.37 
7.80 
3.15 
4.65 
5.83 
% Money plus Quasi-
MoneyofGDP 
17.06 
17.62 
21.13 
1944 
22.83 
24.39 
22.96 
18.56 
31.52 
27.09 
29.22 
28.41 
25.61 
29.48 
25.29 
25.01 
29.47 
21.01 
17.70 
12.94 
13.40 
17.34 
19.87 
19.23 
19.64 
22.11 
Source: The World bank. 
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The Nigerien formal fmancial system is characterized by a nominal growth of money 
aggregates that has not lead to a comparable increase in loans. In fact, overall credit to the economy 
has been declining despite a growth in deposits. The excess reserves of banks were used instead to 
purchase other assets or were placed with the central bank, BCEAO. The policies in BCEAO that 
put a ceiling on amount of credit by bank, a ceiling on interest rates on loans5, and offers a rediscount 
facility to banks to finance credit with central bank monetary creation instead of savings 
mobilization certainly encourages banks to limit their services to a narrow customer base. 
III. ASSESSMENT OF THE NIGER CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT 
A. THE CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT IN THE WORLD 
1. History of the Credit Union Movement 
Credit unions (CUs) are thought to have originated in Germany with the advent of the 
Raiffeissen societies in the nineteenth century. Friedrich W. Raiffeissen created the cooperative 
credit institutions to help the poor and the needy and as a charitable organization. As they became 
more self-help oriented, the credit societies grew rapidly throughout Europe to give rise to the credit 
union movement as is known today throughout the world. 
The World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) is the worldwide representative organization 
ofCUs and similar cooperative financial institutions. Members ofWOCCU include seven regional 
and national credit union confederations serving Africa6, Asia, Australia, Canada, the Caribbean, 
Latin America, and the United States. There are four free-standing leagues representing Fiji, Great 
Britain, Ireland and New Zealand. For its developing country members, e.g. Niger, WOCCU 
provides technical and development services, including the design and implementation oflong-term 
programs in institutional development, short-term technical assistance and training projects, and 
assistance in mobilizing human and financial resources. 
WOCCU estimates that there are 37,078 CUs in the world, with a membership of more than 
88 million people, with a penetration rate of 5.13 percent' (WOCCU, 1994 statistical report). 
Savings are estimated at US$ 377.7 billion, loans at US$ 250 billion, reserves at US $13.8 billion 
and assets at US$ 418.4 billion. In developing countries, credit unions play a significant role in 
urban and rural financial markets where the majority of the population is not served by the formal 
5 BCEAO interest rate policy on loans sets an usury rate to be applied by banks which is twice the rediscount 
rate. However, BCEAO has began a restructuring of its procedures mcluding the interest rate policies. 
6 The African Confederation of Cooperative Savings and Credit Associations (ACCOSCA) comprises 28 
countries. 
7 Population penetration is based on working age population of WOCCU member countries. 
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sector. In Africa, Credit unions are estimated at 5,143 organizations, with 2.8 million members, US 
$432.5 million in savings, and US $252 million in assets. 8 The penetration rate is at 1.48 percent for 
African credit unions. Credit union strategy in developing countries focusses primarily on the 
savings mobilization first approach whereby accumulated local savings is granted as loans to 
members-savers instead of relying on outside funding. By generating local resources, CUs have the 
ability to become one of the most important source of financial resource for farm household as well 
micro and small scale entrepreneurs. 
The credit union structure is based on a democratic structure where the members are the 
owners, and cooperation and social responsibility are key operating principles. Credit unions are 
member-owned, member-operated, non-profit organizations that operate as cooperative financial 
organizations. The primary objective of a credit union is to provide safe and efficient savings and 
loan services to its members at a reasonable cost (Dublin, 1966). Credit unions are organized under 
rules and regulations that are fairly uniform wherever they exist. They are democratically-run 
institutions based on the principle of one-person, one-vote and have a common bond that link 
members. In open-bond or community based CUs, members are from the same community, village, 
or residence area. In occupational or closed-bond CUs, members belong to the same profession, or 
are engaged in the same occupation. Thus, occupational CUs have a more homogeneous membership 
than community based credit unions. 
Credit unions mobilize savings and provide loans to their members only.9 The member share 
of a CU is crucial in determining eligibility and size of loan. Credit union members have a right to 
a multiple of their share, frequently two to one (2:1). At times, deposit accounts in some CUs are 
used (in addition to shares) as the basis to establish the loan multiple. There is also usually a formal 
limit on the size of a single loan in a credit union. 
The credit union governance structure is characterized by a one-person one-vote rule, 
implying that voting powers cannot be accumulated by any individual regardless of how many shares 
they own. Managers of CU s are responsible for the day to day decisions, while the ultimate control 
of the organization belongs to the general assembly of members-owners. The owner-client structure 
of CUs can create conflicts among borrowers, savers, and management. Opposition among net 
borrowers and net savers for control of the institution can lead to a borrower-dominated or saver-
dominated credit union. 10 Individual's share capital cannot be traded or sold to others outside of the 
8 These statistics do not include those of Niger which is not yet member of the African Confederation 
(ACCOSCA). 
9 In some Latin American countries e.g. Costa Rica, credit umons provide services to non-members also. This 
is an attempt to mobiltze savings from potential large depositors who are not interested in becommg CU members or 
paying an entree fee. 
10 In a borrower-dominated credit union, a small segment of the membership, net borrowers, capture control 
of the CU to obtain private benefits at the expense of the other members, the net savers (Smith et. AI, 1981). 
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credit union. The member gets restitution of his/her shares upon resignation from the credit union. 
The return on share capital is quite limited in a credit union and most often, the organization pays 
dividends by distributing profits made by the institution to members or in a form of interest rebates 
on loans. Credit unions place their excess liquidity with other financial institutions or with the 
Central Finance Facility (CFF) if one exists. Most often, the CFF is a federation of all credit unions 
in the system and plays the role of :financial intermediary between surplus units and deficit units. The 
CFF lends directly to credit unions against a fee and is in charge of searching the best investment 
alternatives for the liquidity it manages. 
B. THE CREDIT UNION MOVEMENT IN NIGER 
1. Institutional Profile ofthe CUs in Niger 
In response to recommendations by a research team from The Ohio State University in 1986-
87, WOCCU started a pilot project ofCUs in Niger. The study by the Ohio State University found 
that there were no formal fmancial institutions outside of the main urban areas of Niger such as 
Niamey. Rural households, thus, had to rely almost exclusively on informal financial intermediaries 
for financial services. The project of credit unions or Caisses Populaires d'Epargne et de Credit 
(CPECs) as they are known in Niger started in the department ofZinder in 1990. The first three-and-
a-half years of pilot phase, from 1989 to 1991, were used to develop and promote CUs in the Zinder 
department where 11 CPECs were created during that period. In its current phase, the objective of 
the project funded by USAID is to promote and extend CU development in other departments such 
as Maradi, Niamey in addition to Zinder. One specific objective is to create 85 CPECs and reach 
8,000 members by August 1997, accumulate FCFA 119 million (US $148,000)11 in savings, and 
FCF A 74 million (US $256,000) in loans, and FCF A 128 million (US $238,000) in assets. As of 
December 1994, there were 37 CPECs in the departments ofMaradi, Niamey, Kollo and Tillabery. 
The project will continue to promote new CUs and provide support services to them, create a 
representative body, and establish a service association staff and physical infrastructure that will be 
transferred to a national service association at an appropriate time. 
a . Internal Regulations and Operational Philosophies 
Credit Unions in Niger function according to the basic operating principles set out by 
WOCCU for all its affiliated organizations. There are nine principles grouped under three categories: 
11 The exchange rate was US $1 = FCFA 500 after the devaluation of the currency which occurred in January 
1994. 
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(i) Democratic structure 
Open and voluntary membership 
Democratic control 
Non-discrimination 
• (ii) Services to members 
Services to members 
Distribution to members 
Building financial stability 
(iii) Social goals 
On-going education 
Cooperation among cooperatives 
Social responsibilities 
These principles give CUs an almost uniform structure and also provide them with the flexibility to 
adapt to their specific environment. 
b . Membership Growth 
Membership policies in the CPECs remain simple and affordable. Minimum membership fee 
requirements are FCF A 2500 in rural areas and FCF A 3500 or higher in urban areas. 12 Some rural 
CPECs even allow the membership fee to be paid in small increments. The membership fee includes 
a minimum deposit amount of FCF A 500 which buys a member a share. In general, everyone is 
welcome as a member regardless of sector of activity. Services offered to members include savings 
as well as credit. All CPEC members are depositors first and foremost. As the membership grows, 
so is the number of depositors and thus the deposit amount that is later granted as loans. Thus, the 
amount of loans granted is highly dependent on the amount of savings mobilized each year. 
Membership growth in the CPECs is shown in Table 4. As of March 31, 1995, there were 
5390 members (3711 men, 1617 women, and 62 institutional accounts) in 38 CPECs in operation. 
Membership has been growing at an average of more than a 100 percent per year between 1991 and 
March 1995. The number ofCPECs grew from 5 in December 1991 to 37 in December 1994 with 
an average of 10 additional CPECs created every year. With an objective to create 85 CPECs by 
1997, that would require the creation of 48 new CPECs within the next 3 years including 1995, i.e., 
an average of 15 CPECs every year. However, the objective of reaching 8,000 members by August 
1997 might become a reality sooner than expected (end of 1995) if the annual membership growth 
rate of 100 percent is maintained. Only a few CPECs are gender-based and there were six all-female 
CUs, three all-male CUs, and the rest was gender-mixed CUs. Membership growth by gender is 
reflected is Table 5 with men representing 68 percent of the membership, women 30.7 percent, and 
12 The highest membership fee was registered in Yancin Kai (USAID CPEC) with FCFA 9500 requirement. 
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groups 1.2 percent. The all-female CPECs represent more than 44 percent of the female membership 
in the organization. 
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Table 4: Number and Growth of Credit Unions in Niger, 1990-1995 
Date Total CUs Zinder Maradi Niamey Tillabery Dosso Increase (%) 
--
5 5 
12-31-90 
12-31-91 5 5 -- -- -- -- 0.00 
12-31-92 11 10 
-- 1 -- -- 120 
12-31-93 20 13 6 1 -- -- 82 
12-31-94 37 14 14 7 1 1 85 
3-31-95 38 14 15 7 1 1 2.70 
Source: WOCCU/Niger data base. 
-- Not applicable. 
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Table 5: Credit Union Membership Composition and Growth by Gender, 1990-1995 
Total 
Date Men Women Groups Members %Men %Women %Groups Total% 
--
12-31-90 453 57 3 513 88.3 11.1 0.2 100 
-- --
12-31-91 476 73 4 553 86.1 13.2 0.7 100 
(5.07) (28.07) (33.33) (7.80) 
12-31-92 691 280 8 979 70.6 28.6 0.8 100 
(45.17) (283.56) (100.00) (77.03) 
12-31-93 1,554 496 26 2,076 74.9 23.9 1.2 100 
(124.89) (77.14) (225.00) (112.05) 
12-31-94 3,293 1,486 59 4,838 68.1 30.7 1.2 100 
(111.90) (199.60) (126.92) (133.04) 
3-31-95 3,711 1,617 62 5390 68.4 30.0 1.5 100 
(12.69) (8.82) (5.08) (11.41) 
Source: WOCCU/Niger data base. 
Note: Rate increases in percent are in parentheses. 
-- Not applicable. 
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c . CPEC Savings Flows 
Growth in mobilized savings over time is shown in Table 6. As of December 31, 1994, the 
CUs in Niger had accumulated FCF A 88.4 million in savings deposits, and FCF A 130.2 million in 
assets, thus surpassing the target set for 1997. Savings increased from FCF A 1 million in 1990 to 
CFA 88.4 million in 1994. A savings growth of 406.5 percent was recorded in one year, i.e., from 
1993 to 1994 when CU membership grew from 2,076 to 4,838 members. By March 1995, total 
deposit amount reached FCFA 118.5 million, i.e., an increase of 34 percent over a three month 
period and despite the devaluation of the currency that took place in early 1994. At this point, only 
one type of deposit account is available to CPEC members. It earns no interest except for the 
dividend that is paid at the end of the year in case of profit. There is also a lottery that rewards the 
best saver of the year. There is a definite need for term deposit accounts which would pay 
competitive rates of interest and attract potential net savers. It would also allow the management 
to manage liquidity better. 
Table 6: Growth in Credit Union Assets, Deposits and Shares, 1990-1995 (FCFA) 
Total Savings Total %Growth %Growth o/o Growth 
Date Total Assets Deposits Shares Assets Deposits Shares 
12-31-90 2,737,440 1,052,050 517,250 
12-31-91 4,118,585 2,387,520 553,825 50.4 126.9 7.1 
12-31-92 11,808,619 7,150,984 1,282,535 186.7 199.5 131.6 
12-31-93 27,790,082 17,454,522 2,635,785 135.3 144.1 105.5 
12-31-94 130,277,500 88,407,578 5,832,715 368.8 406.5 121.3 
3-31-95 159,984,748 118,504,987 6,600,780 22.80 34.04 13.17 
Source: WOCCU/Niger data base. 
-- Not applicable. 
d. CPEC Credit Flows 
General credit policies are similar in all CPECs and more stringent during the first year in 
which the CPEC engages in credit activities: 
• Minimum deposit of FCF A 5000 is required to apply for a loan 
• At least three months of membership is required 
• A member has a right to a loan multiple equivalent to a multiple of his/her deposit 
(frequently 2:1). 
• A co-signor who is also a member is required for any loan and must have sufficient 
funds to cover the entire amount of the loan. 
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After a year of activity, CPECs can revise their loan policies. Thus, loan multiple can change 
from 2: 1 to 3:1. Most CPECs also find the co-signor requirement too restrictive and revise their loan 
policies after a year of activities to include accepting tangible collateral. At this point, different 
CPECs accept land as a collateral, property and other physical assets. In women CPECs, gold 
jewelry and woven clothing materials are also accepted as collateral. In the second year of loan 
granting collateral should cover 75 percent of the loan, and 50 percent should be covered in the third 
year and beyond. The required collateral needs to be a credible threat for contract enforcement and 
by accepting more tangible collateral, the CPECs are taking more risks and would need to monitor 
their loans more closely to avoid any rise in delinquent loans or default. 
Loans are granted for a variety of purposes defmed by each CPEC and fungibility makes it 
hard to trace any uses of loans. What is important for the CPECs loan committee is to make sure the 
borrower is credit worthy and that the required collateral discourages any loan default i.e. acts as a 
credible threat. Loan characteristics are fairly similar across CPECs: 
• Size of the Loan: The maximum amount that can be granted to a single member depends on 
the CPEC and varies from FCF A 100,000 to FCF A 1 million. In some CPECs, not more than 
10 percent of the available loanable funds can be given as loan to a single individual. For 
example, if the CPEC has FCF A 1 million available as loanable funds, the maximum granted 
to a single individual would be FCFA 100,000. In general, 70 percent of the members' 
deposits constitute the CPEC loanable fund amount. The rest is kept as reserves. In case of 
liquidity shortage, all loan activity is stopped until more outstanding loans are repaid. There 
has been instances of credit amount rationing due to a lack of funds in some credit unions. 
Quantity rationing may also occur for the same reason as priority is given to smaller loan 
applicants after a liquidity shortage. That could encourage some members to demand smaller 
loan amounts. However, some CPECs (women CPECs) are experiencing a rather low loan 
activity and are encouraging their members to borrow more so that the CPEC can earn more 
interest income. 
• Cost of a Loan: All loans carry a 2 percent per month interest rate on the outstanding 
amount due. Most loans usually require installment payments of principal plus 2 percent each 
month. Penalties (2 percent of principal due) is applicable in case of late payment. In special 
cases, loans (loans for cattle rearing for example), repayment of principal is due only at the 
end of the loan tenn (5-7 months) with interest payments still due every month. 
• Term Structure of a loan: The average length of a loan has been determined to be five 
months. The majority ofloans never exceeds a year and in some CPECs, the maximum tenn 
is six months. 
Credit unions started granting loans in 1992 and went from 68 to 184loans in 1993. During 
the year 1994 alone, all37 CPECs had granted 1235 loans to a total of 4838 members for a total 
amount ofFCFA 93.3 million, i.e., an average loan size ofFCFA 75,000. The year 1995 seems to 
be following a similar trend and for three months of activities in 1995 (January- March), 38 CPECs 
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have granted 440 loans amounting to close to FCF A 33 million. The years 1992 and 1993 have seen 
smaller loan averages ofFCFA 30,000 and FCF A 42,000 respectively. As more CPECs are created 
in active urban areas and more funds are mobilized, people will probably demand larger loans as the 
figures already predict. The nwnber of members receiving loans has increased from 9 percent of the 
membership in 1993 to 25 percent in 1994. Also, there has been a remarkable increase in the loan 
to savings ratio from 8.7 percent in 1992 to 11.7 percent in 1993 to 48.6 percent in 1994. 
Total loan outstanding amount was FCF A 50.1 million in March 31, 1995 with an excellent 
loan recovery record of close to 100 percent. However, there has been some arrears in payment of 
FCFA 7,277,743, i.e., 14.5 percent of all due loans were between one and 12 months late with 5.6 
percent between six and 12 months late (Table 7). Although there is no loans more than a year 
overdue, the presence of overdue loans should be taken into account by the CU managers now to 
avoid any future problem. Credit union started making provision for loan losses in 1993 and 
provision for loan losses was FCFA 1,445,253 in March 1995, i.e., 2.9 percent of total loan amount 
in arrears. Ideally, loan loss provision should be 35 percent ofloans delinquent for up to 12 months. 
The provision becomes 100 percent of all loans delinquent for more than a year. 
Table 7: Time Profile of Loans Granted, Repaid, and Arrears in the CUs (1990-1995) 
Out- Loan Loan Loan Loan 
Number Loan standing Amount Amount Amount Amount 
Date of Loans Amount in Loan Not in 0-2 Months 2-6 Months 6-12 Months 
CFA Amount Arrears in Arrears in Arrears in Arrears 
in% in% in% in% 
12-31-90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12-31-91 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12-31-92 68 2,016,500 6,618,890 60.6 19.4 17.8 2.2 
12-31-93 184 7,806,500 2,043,245 67.4 16.1 16.3 0.2 
12-31-94 1,235 93,309,950 42,944,596 72.1 22.6 5.3 0.00 
3-31-95 440 32,863,040 50,189,344 85.50 10.12 3.58 0.81 
Source: WOCCU!Niger data base. 
Note: Growth rates in percent are in parentheses. 
--Not applicable. 
2. Profile of CPECs Visited by the Research Team 
The research team collected information on a total of 16 CPECs in the 10 villages and towns 
where individual surveys were being carried out. 13 Five of the CPECs had an all-female membership, 
13 See Chapters three and four for the results of the surveys. 
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three CPECs were male, and eight were mixed, i.e., admitted both men and women as members. In 
addition to the information obtained from the loans and savings records, a short questionnaire was 
administered to CPEC managers to get more insight about the operation of their particular credit 
union. 
The oldest of the CPECs visited by the research team have been in operation since March 
1989, while the youngest have been granting loans for about a year at the time of the survey in April-
May 1995 (Table 8). Only one CPEC (Dan Balhadi from Kantche) had not yet granted any loans to 
its member due to insufficient funds. 
Table 8: General Characteristics of the Credit Unions Visited by Research Team 
Credit Village/ Began Member- Number Number Number of 
Union Town Department Nature Operation ship Size of Men of Women Groups 
Yal Ware Matameye Zinder Female 07-04-92 
Kaura Matameye Zinder Male 07-31-93 133 133 0.00 0.00 
Tadali S/broum Zinder Male 03-18-90 227 227 0.00 0.00 
Tarana Slbroum Zinder Female 03-18-90 121 0.00 121 0.00 
Mahaman Dung as Zinder Mixed 10-05-92 115 90 23 2 
Kunkuru 
Dan Balhadi Kantche Zinder Male 06-03-92 
Bantuntuma Kantchc! Zinder Female 05-01-92 
Ainahi Zinder Zinder Mixed 10-23-93 
Hangen Nesa Roubassao Maradi Mixed 10-30-93 148 130 18 0.00 
Anfanin Gabi Maradi Mixed 12-04-93 144 96 47 
Kowa Mayaki 
Mintinci Maradi Maradi Female 05-08-94 114 0.00 114 000 
An fan in Tibiri Maradi Mixed 10-23-93 158 98 67 2 
Gobir 
Anfanin Kai Maradi Maradi Mixed 08-14-93 386 370 16 4 
de Zaria 
Adak a Niamey Niamey Mixed 02-19-94 155 73 79 3 
Albarkanta 
Diyauci Niamey Niamey Female 05-15-94 160 0.00 159 
Yancin Kai Niamey Niamey Mixed 08-19-92 131 96 35 0.00 
-Not applicable. 
Source. CPECs files 
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Table 9: Loan Characteristics by Gender in the Credit Unions Visited 
Total Mean Men Number Mean Number of 
Mean Loan Number Loan of Male Women Loan Female 
Credit Union Villageffown Department Nature Amount of Loans Amount Loans Amount Loans 
Yal Ware Matameye Zinder Female 82,069 72 na 000 82,069 72 
Kaura Matameye Zinder Male 138,579 69 138,579 69 na 0 
Tadali Slbroum Zmder Male 74,553 ll4 74,553 114 na 0 
Tarana Slbroum Zinder Female 29,413 63 na 000 29,413 63 
Mahaman Kunkuru Dungas Zinder Mixed 77,729 48 79,400 45 52,667 3 
Dan Balhadi Kantche Zinder Male -- -- -- 000 
Bantuntuma Kantche Zinder Female 24,073 68 na 000 24,073 68 
Ainahi Zinder Zinder Mixed 193,246 140 194,908 103 188,622 37 
Hangen Nesa Roubassao Maradi Mixed 54,881 101 56,958 96 15,000 5 
Anfanin Kowa Gabi Mayaki Maradi Mixed 45,790 69 48,603 63 16,250 6 
Mintmci Maradi Maradi Female 345,000 8 na 000 345,000 8 
Anfanin Gobir Tibiri Maradt Mixed 79,750 20 92,333 15 42,000 5 
Anfanin Kai de Zaria Maradi Maradi Mixed 340,174 46 340,174 46 000 000 
Adaka Albarkanta Nmmey Niamey Mixed 48,611 18 46,818 11 51,428 7 
Diyauci Niamey Niamey Female 69,480 25 na 000 69,480 25 
Yancin Kai Niamey Niamey Mixed 92,758 190 88,819 166 120,000 24 
Total -- -- -- 101,985 1,051 113,367 728 76,333 323 
--Not applicable 
Source CPECs files 
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Table 10: Highest Loan Concentration in the Credit Unions Visited 
Mean Number of Value of 
Number Size of Loan Loan Large Loans (10% of Large %of Loan 
Credit Union Village Department Nature of Loans Portfolio Amount Number of Loans) Loans Portfolio 
--
Yal Ware Malam eye Zinder Female 72 5,909,000 82,069 7 1,450,000 24 5 
Kaura Matameye Zinder Male 69 9,562,000 138,579 7 2,190,000 229 
Tadali S/broum Zinder Male 114 8,499,000 74,553 II 3,260,000 38 3 
Tarana S/broum Zinder Female 63 1,853,000 29,413 6 660,000 35 6 
Mahaman Kunkuru Dung as Zinder Mixed 48 3,731,000 77,729 5 1,750,000 469 
Dan Balhadi KantchC Zinder 
Bantuntuma Kantcht\ Zinder Female 68 1,637,000 24,073 7 450,000 27 5 
Ainahi Zinder Zinder Mixed 140 27,054,500 193,246 14 8,000,000 29 6 
HangenNesa Roubassao Maradi Mixed 101 5,543,000 54,881 10 1,970,000 35 5 
Anfanin Kowa Gabi Mayaki Maradi Mixed 69 3,159,500 45,790 7 1,084,500 34 3 
Mintinci Maradi Maradi Female 8 2,760,000 345,000 I 1,000,000 36 2 
Anfanin Gobir Tibiri Maradi Mixed 20 1,595,000 79,750 2 600,000 37 6 
Anfanin Kai de Maradi Maradi Mixed 46 15,648,000 340,174 5 4,500,000 28 6 
Zaria 
Adaka Albarkanta Niamey Niamey Mixed 18 875,000 48,611 2 250,000 28 6 
Diyauci Niamey Niamey Female 25 1,737,000 69,480 3 300,000 17 3 
Yancin Kai Niamey Niamey Female 190 17,624,000 92,758 19 6,000,000 34 0 
Total -- -- -- 1,051 107,190,000 101,985 105 33,464,500 31 2 
There was no information on loan duration from Yancin Kai/USAID CPEC due to poor record keeping 
-· Not applicable. 
Source· CPECs files. 
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The analysis of the loan records for all loans granted since the opening of each CPEC 
revealed that a total of 1051 loans have gone out to members thus far with an average loan size of 
FCFA 101,985 (Table 9). Men received a total of728loans at an average FCFA 113,367 and women 
received 323loans with an average ofFCFA 76,333 (Table 9). Thus, the average male size loan is 
1.5 times larger than the average female loan. Also, women demand loans for a considerably shorter 
period of time than men. However, both men and women usually demand credit for about five 
months on average. 
The total size of the loan portfolio for alll051loans was FCFA 107,190,000 yielding an 
average loan size ofFCFA 101,985 (Table 10). However, the CPECs made a few very large loans, 
with FCF A 1 ,000,000 being the largest amount granted for a single loan. Considering 10 percent 
of the total number of loans granted at very large amounts, the total sum disbursed for the largest 
loans reached FCFA 33,464,500 representing an average of 31.2 percent of the total loan portfolio. 
Most credit unions in the sample were very close or below that average when it came to granting 
very large loans. The only exception was Mahaman Kunkuru credit union of Dungas in Zinder 
department whose value of large loans reached 4 7 percent of the total loan portfolio and represented 
only five loans out of a total of 48 loans granted. So few loans being concentrated in a hand of so 
few people leave the credit union at the mercy almost of a handful of members, and this is a situation 
that should be avoided for the well being of the association. 
Fortunately, the credit unions in the sample, at the image of the whole credit union movement 
in Niger, have been very successful in loan repayment, being close to 100 percent repayment rate, 
although arrears are more common and should be monitored carefully. All CPECs are still young 
and have not had any big problems with loan recovery. But as credit policies change and the CPECs 
grant more loans and accept other forms of collateral than the traditional co-signor guarantee, the 
credit committee role would become crucial to avoid any rise in loan delinquency or default. 
C. CPECsFTINANCLALPERFO~CE 
1. Credit Union Financial Ratios 
a. PEARLS and CU Rating 
Banks use CAMEL (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings record, 
and Liquidity position) to assess the performance of the institution and that rating system, although 
excellent, is not adapted to the special nature of cooperative type institutions. The credit union 
performance rating system is based instead on PEARLS (Protection, Effective financial structure, 
Asset quality, Rate of return and costs, Liquidity, and Signs of growth). The PEARLS system uses 
36 fmancial ratios to assess the viability of the CU as a cooperative fmancial institution (see Table 
11). Due to the young age of the Niger CU movement, not all36 ratios could be obtained and the 
available ratios are presented in Table 12. The principal purpose of a financial ratings system is to 
provide information for both comparative and regulatory purposes. A rating system permits early 
detection of emerging problems and can therefore indicate measures that are needed to improve the 
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safety and soundness of a CU. Some ratios are better indicators than others of the future of the 
institution and are able to provide sufficient information to managers to quickly evaluate the 
financial viability of the association. These key ratios included in Table 12 are discussed below: 14 
Table 11: List of PEARLS Ratios 
P = Protection 
P 1 Provision for Loan Losses/Delinquency > 12 months 
P2 Provision for Loan Losses I Total Delinquency 
E = Effective Financial Structure 
E 1 Loans I Total Assets 
E2 Stocks and Bonds Investments I Total Assets 
E3 Other Investments I Total Assets 
E4 Liquid Cash Investments I Total Assets 
E5 Deposits I Total Assets 
E6 External Borrowing I Total Assets 
E7 Shares I Total Assets 
E8 Institutional Capital I Total Assets 
A= Asset Quality 
A1 Total Loan Delinquency I Total Loan Portfolio 
A2 Non-performing Assets in Liquidation I Total Assets 
A3 Annual Loan Charge-offs I Average Loan Portfolio 
~ Accumulated Recoveries from Charged-off Loans/ Accumulated Loans Charged-off 
As Non-earning Assets I Total Assets 
At, Institutional Capital + Zero Cost Liabilities I Non-earning Assets 
A7 Financial Stabilization Counterpart (Stabilization Fund) 
R = Rates of Return and Cost 
R1 Total Loan Income I Average Loan Portfolio 
R2 Total Liquid Cash Investments Income I Average Liquid Cash Investments 
R3 Total Stock & Bond Investment Income I Average Stock & Bond Investment 
~ Total Other Investment Income I Average Other Investment Income 
R5 Total Interest Cost on Savings Deposits I Average Savings Deposits 
~ Total Interest (Dividend) Cost on Shares I Average Shares 
R7 Total Gross Income Margin I Total Average Assets 
R3 Total Operational (Overhead) Expenses I Total Average Assets 
R.; Total Loan Loss Provision Expense I Average Total Assets 
R10 Net Earnings I Average Total Assets 
L = Liquidity 
L1 [Total Liquid Cash Investments- Immediate Obligations] I Savings Deposits 
L2 Corporate (CFF) Liquidity Reserves I Savings Deposit 
L3 [Cash on Hand+ Checking Accounts] I Total Assets 
S = Signs of Growth 
S1 Growth in Total Assets 
S2 Growth in Loans 
S3 Growth in Deposits 
S4 Growth in Shares 
S5 Growth in Institutional Capital 
S6 Growth in Membership 
Source: David C. Richardson (WOCCU Advisor's workshop). 
14 The discussion of the PEARLS ratio is based on "The PEARLS Ratings System Instructions" by David C. 
Richardson, WOCCU Advisor's workshop, June 21-25, 1993. 
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Table 12: Average PEARLS Ratios Obtained for Niger CUs 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Ratio (N=S) (N=S) (N=11) (N=20) (N=37) 
PI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
P2 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.53 0.73 
E1 0.00 0.00 3.67 4.94 28.46 
E4 71.92 78.20 72.99 69.66 48.76 
ES 35.24 50.64 51.37 48.78 56.69 
E7 18.04 14.38 12.59 11.12 6.68 
E8 0.00 96.18 28.76 27.09 5.38 
A1 0.00 0.00 10.19 11.04 10.51 
AS 83.88 73.80 72.57 60.19 55.63 
R1 0.00 0.00 16.65 . 19.30 53.39 
R2 0.00 0.02 3.13 0.25 0.21 
R5 0.00 0.00 2.76 0.00 0.00 
R7 2.00 2.20 2.45 9.72 11.63 
RIO 37.28 0.26 15.05 11.45 12.62 
Ll 238.78 169.90 159.48 146.21 97.70 
L3 55.80 52.00 49.98 35.34 26.48 
Sl 0.00 45.14 17.08 34.11 141.71 
S2 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.05 478.05 
S3 0.00 113.84 16.99 57.47 182.18 
S4 0.00 10.24 3.75 4.92 27.69 
S5 0.00 -100.48 212.37 6.79 213.55 
86 0.00 11.04 3.39 5.13 27.68 
Source: WOCCU/Niger data base. 
P: Protection Ratios 
P1 (Provision for Loan Losses/Delinquency>l2 months) measures the credit union's ability 
to absorb losses. This ratio evaluates the effects of default on the CU. Since P1 is concerned with 
loans delinquent for more than 12 months; i.e., those having the highest risk of default, the provision 
should be a minimum of 100 percent. Credit unions in Niger have no delinquent loans over 12 
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months, and thus P 1 was not applicable to the movement. Another ratio that measures the CU' s 
ability to absorb losses, and is applicable to the Niger movement is P2 (Provision for loan 
losses!Total Delinquency). Although not a key ratio, P2 which takes into account total delinquency 
should ideally be 35 percent. Niger CUs did not start provisions for loan losses untill993 and only 
a few CUs do make provisions. Thus, the ratio remains inadequate at 0.73 in 1994 to cover potential 
losses and has even decreased from its level of 11.53 in 1993. 
E: Effective Financial Structure Ratios 
E1 (Loans/Total Assets), :ij (Deposits/Total Assets), andgE (Institutional CapitaVTotal 
Assets) measure the composition of the most important accounts on the CU's balance sheet. E1 
measures the percentage of total assets that are invested in net loans; i.e., total loans minus loan loss 
reserves. If a CU is to generate adequate income and still remain sufficiently liquid, this ratio should 
be a minimum of 50 and a maximum of70 percent (according to the Niger CUs loan policy). E1 is 
still relatively small in the Nigerien movement (28.46 percent in 1994) but has seen a rapid growth 
from 3.67 percent in 1992 when the CUs starting granting loans to their members. 
E5 measures the percentage of total assets that are financed by savings. The goal is a ratio 
between 70-80 percent. E5 is also below the target at 56.69 percent in 1994 implying that the CUs 
still need to put more efforts in savings mobilization. 
E8 measures the percentage of total assets that are fmanced by institutional capital; i.e., 
retained earnings and current surplus (net income). The goal here is to have a minimum of 1 () 
percent. E8 has been decreasing over the years to 5.38 in 1994, which is below the targeted 
minimum. 
A: Asset Quality Ratios 
A 1 (Total Loan Delinquencyffotal Loan Portfolio) measures the total percentage of loan 
delinquency in the loan portfolio. This measure uses outstanding delinquent loan balances rather 
than only delinquent loan payments. It gives a more accurate measure of the overall risk to the c;u 
and helps deal with repayment problems before they become "real" problems. A1 should ideally be 
at less than 1 percent and was 10.51 in the Niger CUs in 1994. Although that ratio has remained 
almost constant over the years, it is still too high compared to the ideal goal and in fact reinforces 
the need for adequate loan loss provisions. 
R: Rates of Return and Costs Ratios 
R7 (Total Gross Income Margin!fotal Average Assets) and R10 (Net Earnings/Average Total 
Assets) measure the average income yields for the productive assets in the balance sheet. R7 
measures the total income margin generated before subtracting overhead expenses, loan loss 
provisions, and other extraordinary items. R7 has seen an increase from 2.0 in 1990 to 11.63 in 1994 
as a result of income margin increasing over total assets and an indication that the CU s' increasing 
ability to generating sufficient income to cover operational (overhead) expenses. 
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RIO measures the adequacy of CU earnings and its capacity to build up institutional capital. 
The goal of the CU is to generate a ratio that allows the institution to attain the goal of E8 
(Institutional capitalffotal assets). RIO of 12.62 percent was recorded in 1994 indicating decent net 
earnings by the CUs in Niger. 
L: Liquidity Ratios 
L1 (Total Liquid Cash Investments-Immediate Obligations/ Savings Deposits) measures the 
adequacy of the CU's liquid cash reserves to satisfy savings withdrawal requests, after paying all 
immediate obligations due in 30 days or less. The goal is to obtain a ratio L1 of at least 20 percent. 
L1 has been decreasing from 138.78 percent in 1990 to 97.70 percent in 1994 which indicates more 
than adequate liquid cash reserves. However, this is an indication that CUs in Niger have invested 
only a small portion of savers' deposits. 
S: Signs of Growth Ratios 
S1 (Growth in total assets) measures the growth of total assets from one year to the next. It 
should ideally be greater than the inflation rate which was 8-15 percent for 1990-1993 and more than 
30 percent for 1994 due to the effect of the currency devaluation. S1 has always been above the 
inflation rate in the Niger CUs since 1991 and shown tremendous growth of 141.7 percent between 
1993 and 1994. 
Other indicators of growth are S2 (Growth in Loans) and~ (Growth in Deposits) which 
measure the percentage growth of both loans and savings deposits from one year to the next. Both 
are essential to the long run viability of the CU. S2 measures loan growth and should be greater than 
the inflation rate. S2 has grown from 12.04 in 1993 to 478.05 percent in 1994 indicating the 
tremendous growth in loans seen at the CUs. S3 measures savings growth from one year to the next. 
Here too, the CU's goal should be an amount greater than the inflation rate. S3 was at 182.17 percent 
in 1994 due mainly to the creation of several new CU s and an increasing membership base. 
These PEARLS ratios reveal that the CUs in Niger need to increase their provision for loan 
losses, put more efforts on savings mobilization despite decent earnings. There is also too much 
liquidity that needs to be invested. However, investment opportunities in Niger are limited for the 
CUs. There are no government treasury bills and investment of excess liquidity in commercial bank 
deposit instruments does not provide an adequate return. The only real option, although still a 
project, remains the CFF which would allow surplus-units CPECs to place their excess funds in the 
CFF, in return for an adequate yield on their placements. At this stage of the growth of the Niger 
CUs, the PEARLS ratios do not reflect the complete image of the fmancial viability of the 
institutions and should be viewed with caution. 
b . Niger CUs PEARLS Composite Scores 
PEARLS composite scores are obtained as an average of each P, E, A, R, L, S, that apply to 
the credit union. The scores were calculated for the years 1990-1994 for the 37 CPECs and are 
presented in Table 13. A good perfonning CU should have a composite PEARLS score less or equal 
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to two. For all 3 7 CUs operating in Niger December 1994, scores are in the 2-2.5 range. Composite 
score by department ranged from 2.2 to 3.5 for Zinder, 1.9 to 3.5 for Maradi, and 1.9 to 2.6 for 
Niamey, and 2.4-2.5 for Kollo and Tillabery regions (Table 13). Although, the overall score is 
greater than two for the Nigerien CUs, that should not be a reason for concern given the very young 
age of these institutions. A more urgent problem is for the management to ensure that the CU 
maintains a neutral behavior, i.e., treats borrowers and savers such that both member groups are 
equally benefited. 
Table 13: Composite PEARLS Scores for Credit Unions in Niger 
Credit Union 12-31-90 12-31-91 12-31-92 12-31-93 12-31-94 
The Zinder Region 
Ainahi 3.08 2.93 
Batuntuma 2.46 2.30 2.93 
Dan Balhadi 2.50 2.33 2.23 
Darnako 2.50 2.23 
Galadima 2.50 2.40 3.47 2.33 2.80 
Hakinni Dan Hajara 2.50 2.13 2.23 2.73 2.83 
Huddu Haushi 2.42 
Kaura 2.67 2.70 
Kullu 2.50 2.23 2.73 3.13 3.50 
Mahaman Bacira 2.50 2.70 3.10 
Mahaman Kunkuru 2.50 2.70 3.10 
Tadali 2.38 2.33 3.101 3.7 3.20 
Tarana 2.38 2.23 3.17 3.10 2.73 
Yal Ware 2.42 2.30 3.07 
The Niamey Region 
Adaka Albarkanta 2.08 
Bon Jare 2.25 
Bonkanay 2.00 
Diyauci 2.25 
Solidarite 2.42 
YancinKai 2.07 2.58 2.00 
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Yuni No Gomni 1.92 
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Table 13: Composite PEARLS Scores for Credit Unions in Niger (continued) 
Credit Union 12-31-90 12-31-91 12-31-92 12-31-93 12-31-94 
AnfaninKai 
Anfanin Katsina 
Anfanin Kowa 
DadinKowa 
DanKunna 
HangenNesa 
Karuwa 
Mitinci 
Tannamuwa 
Tattalin Jamaa 
Timidria 
Yado 
Zak:ut 
Suji Ma Zumbu 
Gomni 
The Ma:radi Region 
The Kollo and Tillabery Regions 
Source: WOCCU/Niger data base. 
-- Not applicable. 
2.04 
2.50 
2.50 
2.13 
2.50 
2.63 
2.46 
2.83 
2.13 
2.04 
2.37 
2.38 
2.33 
3.00 
2.13 
2.57 
3.46 
1.97 
2.40 
2.50 
D. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF A CREDIT UNION 
A theoretical framework that takes into account CUs' unique characteristics has been 
developed by Smith, Cargil, and Meyer (1981). The model is based on two fundamental 
requirements. First, the specification of the objective function that focusses on the value of CU 
participation to members. Second, the analysis explicitly considers the possibility of conflict among 
members, and the resolution of that conflict being a preference to either the borrowers or savers. 
Smith et al's model is an extension of a previous work by Taylor (1971) and Flannery (1974) to 
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show the different output decisions for four behavioral motivations: profit maximization, borrower 
domination, saver domination, and neutrality. 
Under a riskless environment assumption, the generalized objective function is: 
).. NGL + a NGS + 1t 
Subject to: 
A balance sheet constraint: 
L - S = D 
A non-negative operating surplus constraint: 
1t = r L-r S-r D-C L-C S-E~o L S DM L S 
Linear specifications of loan demand and savings supply schedules are: 
a>O 
S = ~(rs-rsM>' ~>0 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
The Net Gain on Loans (NGL) is the value to the borrower and is represented by the 
difference between the CU loan rate, rL and the best alternative market rate, rLM• times the level of 
loan activity L. The Net Gain on Savings (NGS) is represented by the difference between the CU 
dividend rate on savings rs, and the best alternative market rate available SM , times the level of 
savings S. The weighting parameters ).. and a are used to deal with the issue of saver vs. borrower-
dominated as well as neutral credit union. 
L is the level ofloans (L~O), S is the level of share deposits (S~O), and D~::;; 0 is the level 
of debt issued ifL > S (e.g. borrowing from a central liquidity facility) or is the level of money 
market investment ifL < S. 
The nonnegative operating surplus (1t) is what is available for distribution to members as an 
interest rebate on loans or a bonus dividend on savings. It takes into account the exogenous rate rnM 
which is assumed to be the same irrespective of whether D is a debt issue (D>O) or investment 
(D<O). The average cost of processing loans is CL, and C8 is the average cost of servicing savings 
accounts. Both costs are assumed to be constant. E is defined as the sum of all fixed expenditures. 
This includes the cost of renting capital equipment, building space and any other costs associated 
with providing non-financial services to members. 
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The linear specifications of loan demand schedule (4) and savings supply schedule (5) are 
used to complete the model. Equation ( 4) says that the quantity of loans demanded is proportional 
to the spread between the CU loan rate, rL> and the best alternative market rate rLM· The market rates 
rLM• and rsM are exogenously determined. 
The expanded form of the constrained optimization problem becomes: 
(6) 
Subject to: 
1C == r L L - r s S - r DM D - C L L - C s S - E ~ 0 (7) 
(8) 
The CU chooses the optimal loan and dividend rates, rL· and r8*, to maximize a function of the total 
net gain available to its membership subject to the non-negative surplus constraint and balance sheet 
constraint. The model assumes that the parameters A. and a are scaled such that their values fall 
between zero and one under the different cases of profit maximization, borrower domination, saver 
domination, and neutrality between borrower and saver interests. 
(a) Profit maximization (A.= 0, a= 0) 
The CU maximizes the surplus to be distributed (retained) irrespective of the value of 
transactions to members. In this case the optimal rates are: 
(9) 
(10) 
The maximum surplus becomes: 
rc* == 
(r LM - r DM - C L)2 + P<r DM - r SM - C s)2 _ E (11) 
4 
It should be noted that expression (11) places a ceiling onE, since rc· ~ 0. 
(b) Complete borrower-domination (A.= 1, a= 0). 
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Gains to borrowers carry a greater weight in the overall objective function than gains to 
savers. The CU surplus is used to subsidize the lowest loan rate and maximum loan level possible. 
The optimal rates will be as follows: 
rDM + CL rDM rSM - c p (r DM - r SM - C S) 
L .[ 1 + 
2 2 Ct(rLM - rDM -
(12) 
rDM rSM - c 
• 
= 
s 
r s 2 
(13) 
It should be noted that in this case the objective function becomes a simple maximization of 
NGL + 1t. Also the non-negative surplus constraint is binding, i.e., 1t* = 0. 
(c) Complete saver-domination (.A. = 0, a = 1 ). 
The CU surplus is used to pay the highest possible dividend rate and have the greatest 
savings level possible. Here, as with the borrower-dominated case, the surplus constraint is binding 
at 1t'" = 0. The optimal rates are: 
7DM [1 + 
(d) Neutrality (.A.= 1, a= 1) 
(r LM - 7 DM - C L )2 - 4 
PCrDM - 7SM - Cs )2 
(15) 
The CU's objective is to maximize the total gain to its borrowers and savers. The surplus 
is distributed equally between lower interest costs to borrower and higher dividend rates to savers. 
With a binding surplus constraint (1t*=O), the optimal rates are: 
7DM + CL riM 7DM - CL 
. [1 4B 
+ 2 2 a(rLM - rDM - CL)z + ~(rDM - r (15) 
rSM - Cs 7DM rSM - Cs 
. [1 - 4E 
2 2 IX(rLM - rDM - CL)z + PCrDM - r. 
(16) 
If E (the expenditure on fixed costs, other member services, or retained earnings) is set to its 
maximum rate, then the optimal rates reduce to the surplus or profit maximizing rates of case a. 
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Smith et al. argue that there are good reasons to believe that a CU would usually adopt the 
equal treatment case, i.e., maximize the total gains to both borrowers and savers, especially if the 
membership is equally distributed between savers and borrowers. In a neutral CU, savers will be 
paid a rate of interest on savings deposits that is higher than the rate paid in the profit maximizing 
CU, and borrowers will be paid a rate on loans that is lower than that of a profit maximizing CU. 
Also, the loan rate for a borrower oriented CU will be less than a neutral CU and the dividend rate 
will also be less than the one prevailing in a neutral CU. In a saver-dominated CU, both the loan rate 
and the dividend rate will be more than in a neutral CU. Thus, a borrower-dominated CU will issue 
more debt or invest less than if equal treatment were the norm; and a saver-oriented CU will issue 
less debt or invest more than in a neutral CU. 
E. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL FOR THE NIGER CU MOVEMENT 
Empirical test of the Smith et al. model by Patin and McNiel (1991) revealed that the 
majority ofCUs in the USA exhibited relatively balanced behavior, although some CUs exhibited 
tendencies towards saver-dominated or borrower-oriented behavior. Results further indicated that 
occupational CUs have a significantly stronger saver-orientation than either associational or 
residential CUs, while associational CUs exhibit almost perfect neutrality between borrowers and 
savers. Both of these results imply that member group domination is an important feature of CU 
behavior and that empirical tests of CU behavior should take member group domination into 
account. However, Patin et al. conclude that the economic justification of the CU movement was 
enhanced by the fact that neutrality was the most prevalent type of behavior identified. 
1. The Empirical Model and Data 
Application of Smith et al. theoretical framework is not always possible in developing 
countries where markets are fragmented and incomplete. Poyo (1986) tested a modified version of 
the Smith et al. model for the purpose of testing it in a developing country environment, i.e. 
Honduras. The purpose of empirically testing the behavior of a CU movement like the one in Niger 
is to find out which indicators of future fmancial stability would remain the same or change in the 
future as well as the direction of the change when it occurs. The following model for Niger CUs15 
is an adaptation ofPoyo's (1986) model developed for CUs in Honduras itself derived from the 
Smith et al. theoretical framework and adapted to a developing country setting. Poyo estimated a 
simultaneous seven-equation model that included three savings supply equations, three price setting 
equations, and a loan rationing equation. Due to the nature of the Niger data and environment, the 
present empirical model will include only one savings supply equation and one loan rationing 
equation to be solved simultaneously in a system. The model derived below assumes that CUs in 
Niger operate in highly imperfect and fragmented financial markets.16 Access to formal financial 
15 This model is a revised formulation of a model by Shaw (1995) for Nigenen credxt unions. 
16 See Chapter Five for empirical evidence of the fragmentation of N1ger fmancial markets. 
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services by the rural population is non-existent or limited at best. People in rural areas have to rely 
almost exclusively on the informal fmancial intermediaries of :friends, relatives, money-keepers and 
money-lenders. The model is the following: 
= 0:0 + 0:1 LSRATJO + a2 NLMB + a3 MBSIZE + a.4 FEM..~ 
0:5 RMARADI + a6 UMARADI + a7 RZINDER + a8 UZIN. 
"10 = Po + P1 SAMT + P2 NLMB + P3 MBSIZE + P4 INTR..t 
Ps AGE + P6 SALARYM + £2 
(17) 
(18) 
where the Greek characters tx,, and p,, are the coefficients associated with each variable i, and e, are 
the error terms associated with each equation. The data is a cross-sectional time-series data ( 1990-
1994) obtained from WOCCU-Niger for all37 CPECs. Quarterly data were used for all quantitative 
variables used in the regression. 
The dependent variables: 
SAMT is the real17 stock of savings deposit amount at the end of each quarter. 
LSRA TIO is the outstanding loan/savings ratio. It is the maximum loan size members can 
obtain as multiple of their deposit account balance. 
The independent variables: 
(i) Quantitative variables: 
NLMB is the number of loans received per member. 
MBSIZE is the membership size. 
FEMALE is the percentage of female members in the organization. 
AGE is how long the CU has been in operation. It is expressed in months. 
INTRA TE is the effective interest rate charged on loans by the CU. It takes into account the 
nominal (stated) rate of interest, loan transaction costs such as application fees, and the CU loan 
multiple policy. 18 Using an effective interest rate captures the effective cost associated with the 
17 The deflator used is the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
18 The stated nominal annual rate of interest is the same for all credit unions (24 percent) as is the loan multiple 
(2: 1). Only the loan application fee varies among CUs (from 0 - 3 percent). The effective rate of interest is estimated 
using a formula developed by Poyo (1990) to analyze the Dominican Republic's CU movement. The formula is: 
where: 
(RN Tc - Is<!>) 
R = 
E ( 1 - $) 
The effective interest rate charged on loans 
The stated nominal rate of interest on loans 
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credit union policy of loan amounts, as a multiple of the individual's savings account balance. 
Expected interest on savings (I8) is ignored, since no CUs have established fixed rates on savings. 
Using the formula in the footnote, and given a nominal rate of interest of24 percent, a loan multiple 
of 2:1, and transaction costs between 0- 3 percent, a range of effective interest rates of 48 to 52 
percent was obtained the CUs in Niger. This is an indication that CU members are willing to and 
able to pay high interest rates to secure a loan, given that their only other alternative is the informal 
financial market where the rates could be substantially higher. This could also give an indication that 
the Niger CUs are probably not borrower-dominated at this point because borrowers would have 
used their influence to push the rate down otherwise. 
(ii) Dummy variables: 
Rlv1ARADI indicates whether the CU is located in rural Maradi. 
UMARADI indicates whether the CU is located in urban Maradi. 
RZINDER indicates whether the CU is located in rural Zinder. 
UZINDER indicates whether the CU is located in urban Zinder. 
SALARYM indicates whether the CU manager receives any salary. 
In the savings supply equation, the real average stock of savings deposit amount (SAMT) is 
expected to be positively related to the loan/savings ratio (LSRATIO), the average number ofloans 
per member (NLMB), total membership size (MBSIZE), and the percentage of female members in 
the organization (FEMALE). Dummy variables used to capture both regional differences and 
urban/rural effects are expected to be positively related to SAMT for the two urban variables 
UMARADI and, UZINDER, while the two rural variables RMARADI, and RZINDER are expected 
to have negative signs. The positive signs on the urban regional variables are supposed to capture 
the overall greater total wealth found in urban regions. The percentage of women members 
(FEMALE) illustrates the significance of women's regular savings habits on CU asset accumulation. 
Previous research in Niger indicated that women are more likely to participate in rotating savings 
and credit associations than men (Graham et al., 1987). Regular savings habits developed through 
participation in local ROSCAs carry over into women's savings habits inCUs. Women are more 
likely to be net savers and demand smaller and shorter term loans than men. 
In the loan rationing equation, the loan to savings ratio (LSRATIO) reflects the loan multiple 
policy in the CU. Thus, for a positive relationship between LSRATIO and members' savings 
(SAMT), an increase in savings deposits must be reflected by an increase in larger loans to members. 
If the increase in larger loans is less than the increase in savings, a negative relationship will be 
observed. The average number of loans per saver (NLMB) is expected to be positively related to 
LSRATIO because if, as assumed, people join CUs to ensure future access to credit then the greater 
the chance of receiving a loan, the more loans will members be demanding. 
T c = The explicit transactions costs as a percentage of the loan amount 
Is = The expected interest rate on savings paid by the credit union 
q, = One over the loan multiple 
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An increase in the effective interest rate charged on loans (INTRA TE) would tend to reduce 
the demand for loans and with it the supply of shares or savings, since they represent an implicit 
demand for loans. However, INTRATE will be positively related to LSRATIO if the rise in interest 
rate is not reflected by a decrease in savings because people will save under any conditions including 
negative interest rates paid on deposits. The AGE of the CU expressed in months is expected to be 
positively related to LSRATIO if loan multiple changes, i.e., increases over time. A negative 
relationship will be observed otherwise. The dummy variable (SALAR YM) indicates whether or 
not the manager of the CU received any salary. SALARYM reflects the incentive given to the 
management and is expected to be positively related to LSRATIO. It is expected that paid 
management will increase both the number and amounts of loans granted and increase the credit 
union's ability to manage reimbursements. In general paid management has gone through several 
training sessions and has been on the job for at least six months. The salary incentive to do the best 
job possible will result in higher loans to savings ratios and, therefore, more profitable CU. 
2. Estimation Results 
The simultaneous two*equation model is estimated by the two-stage least square (2SLS) 
procedure using quarterly data available for all37 credit unions since 1990 for the oldest CUs to one 
quarter for the three youngest CUs. There is a total of260 data points or observations. The variables 
used in the estimation are defined in Table 14. The unbalanced nature of the cross-sectional time-
series data set makes the presence of autocorrelation very likely. However, attempts to correct for 
the suspected autocorrelation remained unsuccessful due to the small sample size for individual 
credit unions. A larger sample that includes an additional12*20 quarters is needed to successfully 
use this procedure. A model with autocorrelation will still give unbiased estimators. 
Table 14: Description of Variables Used in Regressions 
Variable Description and Measurement Unit Mean Standard 
Deviation 
SAMT Stock of savings deposits in FCF A FCFA 1,312,232 2110361 
LSRATIO Loan to savings ratio FCFA 18.65 28.59 
NLMB Number ofloans per member 0.11 0.34 
MBSIZE Average membership size 109.70 72.02 
FEMALE Proportion of female membership in percent 31.51 35.87 
RMARADI Dummy for rural Maradi CU 0.15 0.36 
UMARADI Dummy for urban Maradi CU 0.07 0.26 
RZINDER Dummy for rural Zinder CU 0.58 0.49 
UZINDER Dummy for urban Zinder CU 0.08 0.28 
INTRATE Effective interest rate 23.48 25.03 
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AGE Number of months the CU has been in 
operation 
SALARYM Dummy for paid management 
Source: WOCCU/Niger data base. 
17.39 14.72 
0.43 0.50 
The results of the simultaneous equation system are presented in Tables 15 and 16 and show 
good individual R-squares and adjusted R-squares of0.63 and 0.62, and 0.54 and 0.53, respectively, 
for the savings supply and loan rationing equations. All but one variable are significant in the 
savings supply equation, while all variables in the loan rationing equation are significant at either 
one or 10 percent level. The results of the savings supply equation in Table 12 show that, as 
expected, the loan to savings ratio (LSRATIO), the average number of loans per member (NLMB), 
the total membership size (MBSIZE), the percentage of female members (FEMALE), and the 
dummy variables (RMARADI, RZINDER, and UZINDER) representing rural credit unions in the 
Maradi and Zinder regions, and urban credit union in the Zinder region, all have the expected signs 
and are significantly related to the amount of mobilized savings deposits. All variables are 
significant at the 1 percent level. 
Table 15: 2SLS Estimation Results of the Savings Supply Equation 
Variable Para met Parameter t-statistic 
er Estimate 
Constant O:o -617667* -1.74 
LSRATIO a: I 13641** 2.26 
NLMB 0:2 1092762*** 3.21 
:MBSIZE 0:3 18354*** 12.00 
FEMALE 0:4 6511.7*** 2.43 
RMARADI O:s -1517504*** -3.65 
UMARADI 0:6 -986677 -0.22 
RZINDER a:, -899287*** -2.84 
UZINDER O:s 1205284*** 2.76 
R-Square 0.6330 
Adj R-Square 0.6213 
Source: WOCCU-Niger database. 
Note: *, **, ••• denote significance a the I 0, 5, and 1 present level respectively. 
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Table 16: 2SLS Estimation Results of the Loan Rationing Equation 
Variable Para met Parameter t-statistic 
er Estimate 
Constant Po -9.284411 *** -2.97 
SAMT 131 -0.000004702*** -2.79 
NLMB 132 17.480172*** 3.74 
MBSIZE 133 0.132389*** 3.48 
INTRATE ~4 0.678425*** 8.30 
AGE Ps -0.209562* -1.83 
SALARYM 136 12.531164*** 3.76 
R-Square 0.5381 
Adj. R-Square 0.5272 
Source: WOCCU/Niger database. 
Note: *, and * * * denote significance at the I 0 and 1 percent level respectively 
These results indicate that increasing loans to members as is reflected in LSRATIO and 
NLMB will have a positive influence in increasing members deposits. Also, an increase in 
membership size (MBSIZE) naturally leads to a significant increase in savings deposits because all 
CU members are savers first. The female membership (FEMALE) also plays a positive influence 
on the total stock of deposits as expected. Women are known to make small but frequent deposits 
in the CU and to remain net savers in general. Credit unions located in rural areas of Maradi and 
Zinder departments (RMARADI, RZINDER) are shown to generate less savings than those in 
Niamey (the control dummy variable for department). This result is as expected given that Niamey 
is a wealthier area than both Maradi and Zinder. By comparison, UZINDER is shown to generate 
more savings than urban Niamey principally because CUs in Zinder are among the first established 
in the country and have a longer history of a well organized savings mobilization program. 
The results of the loan rationing equation are presented in Table 16 and show that all 
variables are statistically significant at either one or 10 percent level. The negative relationship of 
the stock of savings deposits (SAMT) with the loans to savings ratio (LSRATIO) is an indication 
that the CU loan multiple policy does not match the increase in members savings. That is, the 
maximum loan size members can obtain as a multiple of their deposit account balance does not 
increase to reflect the increase in members' deposits, reflecting a very risk averse lending policy. 
The number of months the CU has been in operation is represented by the AGE variable which is 
significantly negatively related to LSRATIO indicating that CUs in Niger did not exploit their 
maximum loan potential with time. The effective interest rate (INTRA TE) is positive and significant 
indicating that an increase in interest rate does not deter members from applying for loans. This may 
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be an indication that these rates are seen as competitive if th.e member-borrower compares them \Vith 
alternative informal financial rates. Membership size (!vffiSIZE) and the proportion of female 
members (FEMALE) are positively significantly related to LSRA TIO confirming the knowledge that 
more members and especially more female members positively influence the stock of savings which 
consequently increases the number and amount of loans granted. The incentive given to CU 
managers by paying them a salary is shown to be paying off with SALARYM positively and 
significantly related to LSRATIO. Paid management whose performance is reflected in their salary 
will consequently work hard at mobilizing savings as well as providing members with loans. 
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Niger which is one of the poorest countries in the world faced artificial financial deepening 
in a declining economy, with very limited functions by the formal financial system. Semi-formal 
fmancial systems of credit unions and donor funded programs is in full effervescence, however. It 
is doubtful that targeted credit programs and guarantee funds programs with no savings mobilization 
objective are viable and will be sustainable in the long-run. The savings and loan programs like the 
WOCCU credit unions are undoubtedly the type of financial intermediation Nigeriens need most as 
it stresses a savings mobilization-frrst approach and do not rely on donor funds for on-lending 
activities. With the proper prudential and regulatory framework, and a carefully monitored growth, 
credit unions in Niger could become the most important fmancial intermediaries, especially in the 
rural areas of the country which is not and would not be served by the formal system. 
An investigation of the performance of the CU movement in the Nigerien fmancial markets 
has found the young movement to be healthy and rapidly growing as shown by PEARLS ratios and 
descriptive statistics. Membership has increased tremendously in part due to the creation of several 
new CU s every year and more importantly the renewed trust in the financial system. Services 
(savings and loans) have also been increasing although more emphasis needs to be placed on savings 
mobilization, as members are more concerned with a safe place to put their savings. In the future, 
rewarding savers a little more than what is actually done will create a larger pool of net savers and 
prevent the organization form being borrower-dominated. At this stage, the CUs in Niger seem to 
be neutral i.e. treating borrowers and savers equally and that orientation needs to be kept intact. 
Also, the creation of the CFF will offer an attractive investment alternative to surplus unit CPECs 
with too much liquidity and nowhere to place them and earn a decent return. 
The econometric model results point to several elements that are at the core of the growing 
movement and will affect its future growth. Thus, women appear to be an important positive 
element in savings mobilization. Also, members value highly access to loans which potentiality is 
an incentive for saving with the institution. The use of market rates of interest on loans does not 
seem to deter members from borrowing from the CPECs instead of going to the local money lender. 
Using strictly members mobilized savings as loan sources instead of relying on external funds was 
crucial in determining the long term viability and sustainability of the CUs in Niger. 
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Generating larger loan portfolios will allow the CPECs to be financially self-sufficient. This 
can be accomplished by mobilizing more savings and increasing their outstanding loans to savings 
ratios. Successfully increasing the loan portfolios will also require that incentives (monetary 
compensation) be given to management to generate larger loan portfolios. This needs to be done 
even if a limited salary subsidy program is necessary. 
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